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Abstract—We assess the variability of PRNU-based camera
fingerprints with mismatched imaging pipelines (e.g., different
camera ISP or digital darkroom software). We show that camera
fingerprints exhibit non-negligible variations in this setup, which
may lead to unexpected degradation of detection statistics in
real-world use-cases. We tested 13 different pipelines, including
standard digital darkroom software and recent neural-networks.
We observed that correlation between fingerprints from mis-
matched pipelines drops on average to 0.38 and the PCE detection
statistic drops by over 40%. The degradation in error rates
is the strongest for small patches commonly used in photo
manipulation detection, and when neural networks are used for
photo development. At a fixed 0.5% FPR setting, the TPR drops
by 17 ppt (percentage points) for 128 px and 256 px patches.
I. INTRODUCTION
Camera fingerprints based on photo-response non-
uniformity (PRNU) of the imaging sensor are one of the
most reliable tools in photo forensics [1–3]. They have
been studied in the literature for over a decade [4–7] and
are commonly used in two main applications: (1) source
attribution - which links photographs to a specific instance
of a camera; and (2) photo manipulation detection - which
involves a local analysis of the sensor fingerprint to identify
areas of mismatch [8].
The success of PRNU fingerprints stems from their stability
and robustness to various post-processing that happens in
real-world applications (e.g., scaling, or lossy compression).
Some of this post-processing, in particular the impact of JPEG
compression or denoising, have been extensively studied [9–
12]. However, many others remain unexplored. This may lead
to inaccurate detection and under-estimated error rates.
In this work, we empirically assess the sensitivity of PRNU
fingerprints to mismatched imaging pipelines. This scenario
arises when test images are processed differently (e.g., using
3rd-party darkroom software like LibRAW or Lightroom) than
the images used for fingerprint estimation. We believe this
scenario will become increasingly more common with the
progress of machine learning and the increasing adoption of
deep neural networks in various stages of the imaging pipeline
(e.g., demosaicing [13], denoising [14], or tone-mapping [15])
or even instead of it [16]. Moreover, modern darkrooms, e.g.,
Luminar, extensively advertise ML-based solutions in their
image processing and enhancement routines, and such a trend
is likely to increase.
Fig. 1. Image patches of size 64 × 64 px (top) and their residuals (bottom)
from 13 different imaging pipelines operating with default settings.
In this work, we take the first step in this direction and
assess the impact of image signal processor (ISP) i.e., imaging
pipeline variation on PRNU fingerprint analysis. We used
13 software pipelines representing popular digital darkrooms
and 3 neural network architectures. We consider a scenario
where each pipeline uses default settings with minimal post-
processing, and neural-network is trained to reproduce images
visually equivalent to a standard camera pipeline [17, 18] (see
Figure 1 for example image patches and residuals for Nikon
D7000).
The main observations from our work are as follows:
• Correlation between camera fingerprints obtained from
exactly the same images processed by different pipelines
drops on average by 62 %.
• Degradation in detection statistics is the strongest for
smaller image patches (128 or 256 px windows), which
will be particularly detrimental to manipulation detection.
• For large patches (1024 px), standard ISPs reveal little
variation in detection statistics, but the effect remains
strong for neural ISPs.
• For 128 px windows commonly used in manipulation
detection, we observed an average deterioration of 41%
in median PCE and of 17% in TPR at 0.5% FPR.
• Imaging pipelines based on neural networks tend to
distort the camera fingerprints more - TPR dropped by
20% compared to 14% for standard pipelines.
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• Even for traditional pipelines, we observed unexpected
matching failures for some configurations (RawTherapee
and Capture One software with Nikon cameras).
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A PRNU fingerprint of a camera characterizes the consistent
bias of individual pixels in its imaging sensor [8]. The finger-
print is estimated from multiple images by carefully averaging
high-frequency residuals where a denoising filter suppresses
content. At first, a noise residual Ri is computed for each input
image Ii using a denoising filter D as Ri = Ii −D(Ii), i =
1, .., N. In the next step, the fingerprint k is estimated using
maximum likelihood estimation [8]:
k =
N∑
i=1
RiIi
N∑
i=1
(Ii)2
(1)
At test time, the corresponding residual of a test image is
correlated with the camera fingerprint - either globally (for
attribution) or locally (for manipulation detection).
Several enhancement techniques have been proposed to
reduce contamination of PRNU by the image content. Kang
et al. [19] proposed a method that estimates PRNU only from
the phase components of noise residuals. Lin and Li [20]
proposed smoothing the Fourier spectrum of the estimated
PRNU using local averaging. These two methods were based
on the hypothesis that the sensor pattern noise is white noise
(i.e., it has a flat frequency spectrum). On the other hand,
Li [21] assume that PRNU is a weak signal, while scene details
are likely to be much stronger. They proposed several models
that produce weighted versions of wavelet coefficients of a
noise residual. An inverse wavelet transform on the weighted
coefficients provides the enhanced noise residuals.
Various denoising filters have also been evaluated in
the literature. These include a context-adaptive interpolator
(CAI) [5], 2-pixel approach [22], adaptive spatial (AS) filter-
ing [23], content adaptive guided image (CAGI) filtering [24],
and block-matching and 3D (BM3D) algorithm [12, 25].
A recent method proposed usage of a convolutional neural
network (CNN) to improve the estimation of noise residual
extracted by traditional means [26].
The large size and random nature of sensor fingerprints
combined with a computationally expensive fingerprint match-
ing create difficulty in managing large databases. Many meth-
ods have proposed alternative representations [27–30] of the
PRNU fingerprint. A recent method attempts to use a fused
CNN-based approach that combines camera model features
and PRNU to improve small-scale tampering detection [31].
Despite addressing a sensor-level phenomenon, the analysis
is typically performed in the RGB color space. As a result,
the fingerprint is affected by various steps in the camera’s
ISP, e.g., demosaicing, denoising, or tone-mapping. Some
researchers have proposed exploiting knowledge of specific
camera components to estimate a better fingerprint, e.g., given
the color filter array, one can consider only the measured
color channels [32]. Alternatively, a more recent line of work
explores inversion of the ISP and estimation at the raw
level [33, 34].
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
To assess the impact of the image processing pipeline (ISP)
on PRNU fingerprints, we construct a new dataset derived from
raw images from 4 cameras and 13 different ISPs. We then
follow the standard fingerprint estimation procedure [8] and
assess the impact on: (1) the correlation between different fin-
gerprint estimates; (2) the distributions of PCE scores obtained
with mismatched estimation and test ISPs; (3) the receiver
operation statistics and relevant detection metrics (AUC and
TPR at FPR=0.5%).
A. Dataset and Fingerprint Estimation
We collected raw images for 4 cameras: Nikon D7000
(N7k), Nikon D90 (N90), Canon EOS 40D (C4D) and Canon
EOS 5D (C5D). The Nikon and Canon images were taken from
the Raise [35], and MIT-5k [36] datasets, respectively (Ta-
ble I). We collected 120 full-resolution images, out of which
60 were used for PRNU estimation and 60 for subsequent
attribution experiments.
We then processed all images using 13 different ISPs. We
included popular digital darkroom software (both commercial
and open-source) as well as recent neural-network-based ISPs.
We included 10 darkrooms: RawTherapee 5.6 (RT) [37],
Corel AfterShot Pro 3 (AT) [38] LightZone 4.1.9 (LZ) [39],
DCRaw 9.27 (DR) [40], LibRaw 0.17.2 (LR) [41], Affinity
Photo 1.6.6 (AF) [42], Luminar 3 (LR) [43], DXO PhotoLab
2 (DX) [44], Capture One 12 (C1) [45], and Adobe Lightroom
5 (LT) [46]. The neural ISPs included a popular model for joint
demosaicing and denoising (DNet) [47], the UNet (UN) [48]
model, and a simple network that mimics a standard ISP
(INet) [17]. All NN models were trained to reproduce the
result of a standard imaging pipeline.
To assess the most optimistic scenario, we made sure to:
(1) select the same images for PRNU estimation; (2) use an
automatic mode with default settings and no scaling in each
ISP; (3) work on uncompressed bitmap images. In a real-world
setting, these conditions are unlikely to be met.
B. Analysis of Camera Fingerprint Similarity
To compare the PRNU fingerprints, we compute the nor-
malized correlation coefficients between all possible pairs of
estimation pipelines. If necessary, we align the fingerprints by
shifting one of them to the location indicated by a peak in
cross-correlation (needed sometimes due to minor differences
in how ISPs crop the raw images; see Table V in the
supplemental file).
We collected the obtained results in Table II for all four
cameras. It can be observed that despite a conservative
evaluation setting, the estimated fingerprints tend to differ
considerably. The average correlation for all cross-ISP pairs
is only 0.38. Some of the ISPs, e.g., DCRaw, LibRaw, and
Affinity, tend to correlate better, which may indicate some
TABLE I
DIMENSIONS OF PROCESSED IMAGES OBTAINED USING ALL PIPELINES IN OUR DATASET
Camera Processing Pipelines
Camera RT AT LZ DR LR AF LM DX C1 LT IN UN DN
N7k 3272 x 4940 3264 x 4928 3270 x 4938 3280 x 4948 3280 x 4948 3280 x 4948 3264 x 4928 3264 x 4928 Diff. sizes 3264 x 4928 3280 x 4948 3280 x 4948 3280 x 4948
N90 2860 x 4302 2860 x 4290 2858 x 4300 2868 x 4310 2868 x 4310 2868 x 4310 2848 x 4288 2848 x 4288 Diff. sizes 2848 x 4288 2868 x 4310 2868 x 4310 2868 x 4310
C4D 2594 x 3900 - 2592 x 3898 2602 x 3908 2602 x 3908 2602 x 3908 2592 x 3888 2592 x 3888 2592 x 3888 2592 x 3888 2602 x 3908 2602 x 3908 2602 x 3908
C5D 2912 x 4378 - 2910 x 4376 2920 x 4386 2920 x 4386 2920 x 4386 2912 x 4368 2912 x 4368 2912 x 4368 Diff. sizes 2920 x 4386 2920 x 4386 2920 x 4386
TABLE II
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN PRNU FINGERPRINTS USING
DIFFERENT IMAGING PIPELINES.
RT AT LZ DR LR AF LM DX C1 LT IN UN DN
Nikon D7000
RT 1.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
AT 0.03 1.00 0.45 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.35 0.78 0.01 0.69 0.34 0.33 0.56
LZ 0.02 0.45 1.00 0.65 0.71 0.71 0.45 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.24 0.58 0.42
DR 0.02 0.40 0.65 1.00 0.89 0.88 0.44 0.46 0.00 0.46 0.26 0.65 0.45
LR 0.02 0.42 0.71 0.89 1.00 0.93 0.50 0.48 0.00 0.50 0.27 0.69 0.47
AF 0.02 0.43 0.71 0.88 0.93 1.00 0.50 0.49 0.00 0.51 0.28 0.67 0.48
LM 0.02 0.35 0.45 0.44 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.44 0.00 0.51 0.28 0.44 0.44
DX 0.03 0.78 0.50 0.46 0.48 0.49 0.44 1.00 0.01 0.84 0.37 0.39 0.64
C1 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
LT 0.03 0.69 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.84 0.01 1.00 0.37 0.40 0.65
IN 0.02 0.34 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.37 0.01 0.37 1.00 0.28 0.47
UN 0.02 0.33 0.58 0.65 0.69 0.67 0.44 0.39 0.00 0.40 0.28 1.00 0.41
DN 0.02 0.56 0.42 0.45 0.47 0.48 0.44 0.64 0.01 0.65 0.47 0.41 1.00
Nikon D90
RT 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
AT 0.01 1.00 0.32 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.39 0.00 0.35 0.15 0.26 0.23
LZ 0.01 0.32 1.00 0.75 0.77 0.79 0.39 0.41 0.01 0.43 0.15 0.62 0.29
DR 0.01 0.28 0.75 1.00 0.83 0.88 0.33 0.35 0.00 0.36 0.14 0.58 0.28
LR 0.01 0.30 0.77 0.83 1.00 0.89 0.39 0.40 0.01 0.42 0.14 0.64 0.31
AF 0.01 0.29 0.79 0.88 0.89 1.00 0.37 0.37 0.01 0.4 0.13 0.6 0.29
LM 0.01 0.28 0.39 0.33 0.39 0.37 1.00 0.7 0.01 0.44 0.11 0.31 0.27
DX 0.01 0.39 0.41 0.35 0.40 0.37 0.70 1.00 0.01 0.47 0.17 0.33 0.30
C1 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
LT 0.01 0.35 0.43 0.36 0.42 0.40 0.44 0.47 0.01 1.00 0.25 0.33 0.48
IN 0.01 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.17 0.01 0.25 1.00 0.17 0.38
UN 0.01 0.26 0.62 0.58 0.64 0.60 0.31 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.17 1.00 0.31
DN 0.01 0.23 0.29 0.28 0.31 0.29 0.27 0.30 0.01 0.48 0.38 0.31 1.00
Canon EOS 40D
RT 1.00 - 0.69 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.70 0.72 0.51 0.71 0.24 0.16 0.59
AT - - - - - - - - - - - - -
LZ 0.69 - 1.00 0.65 0.72 0.71 0.68 0.82 0.54 0.82 0.24 0.14 0.57
DR 0.74 - 0.65 1.00 0.84 0.84 0.63 0.67 0.45 0.64 0.23 0.17 0.60
LR 0.74 - 0.72 0.84 1.00 0.89 0.71 0.74 0.53 0.72 0.25 0.16 0.66
AF 0.75 - 0.71 0.84 0.89 1.00 0.75 0.71 0.52 0.69 0.24 0.15 0.63
LM 0.70 - 0.68 0.63 0.71 0.75 1.00 0.67 0.57 0.71 0.21 0.12 0.58
DX 0.72 - 0.82 0.67 0.74 0.71 0.67 1.00 0.55 0.84 0.28 0.15 0.60
C1 0.51 - 0.54 0.45 0.53 0.52 0.57 0.55 1.00 0.55 0.17 0.10 0.42
LT 0.71 - 0.82 0.64 0.72 0.69 0.71 0.84 0.55 1.00 0.25 0.15 0.57
IN 0.24 - 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.21 0.28 0.17 0.25 1.00 0.21 0.26
UN 0.16 - 0.14 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.10 0.15 0.21 1.00 0.17
DN 0.59 - 0.57 0.60 0.66 0.63 0.58 0.60 0.42 0.57 0.26 0.17 1.00
Canon EOS 5D
RT 1.00 - 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.61 0.32 0.46 0.60 0.28 0.29 0.59
AT - - - - - - - - - - - - -
LZ 0.39 - 1.00 0.68 0.73 0.74 0.30 0.64 0.24 0.33 0.15 0.55 0.32
DR 0.39 - 0.68 1.00 0.81 0.87 0.28 0.55 0.21 0.28 0.14 0.54 0.32
LR 0.40 - 0.73 0.81 1.00 0.88 0.31 0.61 0.24 0.33 0.15 0.59 0.35
AF 0.40 - 0.74 0.87 0.88 1.00 0.31 0.59 0.24 0.31 0.14 0.57 0.34
LM 0.61 - 0.30 0.28 0.31 0.31 1.00 0.36 0.58 0.72 0.15 0.24 0.51
DX 0.32 - 0.64 0.55 0.61 0.59 0.36 1.00 0.30 0.43 0.12 0.40 0.27
C1 0.46 - 0.24 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.58 0.30 1.00 0.56 0.13 0.17 0.34
LT 0.60 - 0.33 0.28 0.33 0.31 0.72 0.43 0.56 1.00 0.20 0.22 0.46
IN 0.28 - 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.20 1.00 0.12 0.25
UN 0.29 - 0.55 0.54 0.59 0.57 0.24 0.4 0.17 0.22 0.12 1.00 0.30
DN 0.59 - 0.32 0.32 0.35 0.34 0.51 0.27 0.34 0.46 0.25 0.30 1.00
common components in their functionality (e.g., use of the
DCRaw routines in LibRaw [49]).
Interestingly, fingerprints from CaptureOne and RawTher-
apee do not correlate with any other ISPs for neither of
Nikon cameras (marked in red). Based on visual comparison
of image patches, it would appear both programs apply some
slight geometric transformation while cropping full-frame raw
images, which de-synchronizes the fingerprints. We emphasize
that this happens despite explicit instructions to leave image
size intact and that the problem does not occur for Canon
cameras (this may be related to the format of raw images in
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Fig. 2. Distribution of PCE scores for cross-ISP matching (512 px patches);
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Fig. 3. Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves with LibRaw as PRNU
estimation ISP and all pipelines as test.
our dataset - NEF for Nikon and DNG for Canon cameras).
Fig. 4. Example tampering localization results obtained with a camera fingerprint from a mismatched ISP (LibRAW); tampering probability maps were
obtained as p-values from PCE statistics and were post-processed for presentation clarity (contrast + median filter).
C. Impact on PCE Detection Statistics
To assess the impact on fingerprint detection statistics, we
measured peak-to-correlation-energy (PCE) for all possible
pairs of ISPs (using different pipelines for PRNU estimation
and test images). To increase the number of samples, we ex-
tract all possible non-overlapping patches from full-resolution
images. This yields from 600 to 55,000 patches for patch sizes
ranging from 1024 px to 128 px.
In general, using the same imaging pipeline leads to the
best matching performance (see median PCE scores for Nikon
D7000 in Table III and Canon EOS 40 D in Table V of the
supplemental file). In cross-ISP matching, the PCE deteriorates
on average by 61, 56, 50, and 41% for patches of 1024, 512,
256, and 128 px, respectively. Full distributions of PCE scores
for 512 px patches from selected cameras and ISPs are shown
in Figure 2 (results for all cameras are depicted in Figure 5
of the supplemental file). Note that the PCE distributions
are shown in logarithmic scale. Configurations with the same
ISP are shown with solid lines, whereas mismatched digital
darkrooms and neural ISPs are shown with dashed and dotted
lines, respectively.
Overall, we see a similar trend as in fingerprint correlation
(Section III-B). Apart from obvious matching failures for
CaptureOne and RawTherapee for Nikon cameras, we observe
various degrees of PCE deterioration. The most significant and
consistent deterioration occurs for neural ISPs. In some cases,
e.g., for Canon cameras in our experiments, they seemed to
have incompatible fingerprints.
D. Impact on ROC Curves and Error Rates
To assess the impact of ISP mismatch on effective error
rates, we generate full receiver operating characteristics (ROC
curves). An example set of ROC curves for smaller patch sizes
(i.e., 256 and 128 px), selective cameras, and a single PRNU
estimation ISP (LibRaw) is shown in Figure 3. Analogously
to previous experiments, we can see a significant variation
of matching performance with the strongest deterioration for
small patch sizes and for neural ISPs.
To quantitatively summarize the degradation, we show true
positive rates corresponding to a fixed 0.5% false-positive rate
(Table IV). We focus on 128 and 256 px patches due to the
much larger number of available samples. For the illustrated
LibRaw and Affinity Photo ISPs, the average deterioration in
TPR was 17 percentage points (13 ppt for well-synchronized
standard darkroom software and 20 ppt for neural ISPs).
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Our results illustrate that camera fingerprints exhibit non-
negligible variation with the imaging pipeline. Despite choos-
TABLE III
MEDIAN PCE VALUES FOR CROSS-PIPELINE ATTRIBUTION OF
NON-OVERLAPPING PATCHES FROM NIKON D7000
Image Processing Pipelines for Test Images
PRNU
ISP RT AT LZ DR LR AF LM DX C1 LT IN UN DN
Patch size = 1024 x 1024 pixels (∼600 patches per camera per pipeline)
RT 198 10 10 11 11 11 11 10 10 10 11 12 13
AT 10 880 865 978 1105 1176 833 936 10 1072 209 550 926
LZ 11 1617 2324 2338 2714 3057 2333 2071 10 2584 632 1523 2326
DR 11 1591 2042 2840 3169 3389 2355 1982 10 2539 675 1838 2663
LR 11 1766 2310 3060 3538 3802 2647 2242 10 2786 769 2049 3036
AF 10 1672 2137 2770 3300 3626 2520 2113 10 2719 743 1843 2721
LM 12 1915 2692 3635 4252 4355 5098 2977 10 3833 1255 2923 3741
DX 10 926 1046 1187 1385 1471 1233 1170 10 1436 224 699 1183
C1 9 10 9 11 10 10 10 9 15425 10 10 10 12
LT 10 1036 1193 1423 1624 1726 1555 1332 10 3261 306 870 1430
IN 10 206 241 298 343 390 372 217 10 327 733 286 349
UN 11 973 1317 1859 2116 2299 1997 1343 10 1766 704 1927 2010
DN 10 811 973 1218 1399 1513 1171 1018 10 1265 347 821 1444
Patch size = 512 x 512 pixels (∼3000 patches per camera per pipeline)
RT 44 10 10 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 11 11 12
AT 10 200 203 196 221 226 169 218 10 243 44 111 176
LZ 11 427 554 538 626 650 517 519 10 590 135 334 500
DR 11 379 458 653 704 747 479 446 10 525 143 386 557
LR 11 421 527 699 811 856 556 518 10 609 169 437 639
AF 11 437 546 735 846 906 590 541 10 637 187 471 661
LM 11 480 682 757 872 930 1201 718 10 920 245 601 735
DX 10 215 247 239 275 286 250 272 10 327 47 142 224
C1 10 10 10 11 10 10 10 9 3374 10 10 11 11
LT 10 243 288 289 332 346 326 313 10 681 67 182 272
IN 10 45 57 63 69 74 71 46 10 68 142 58 65
UN 11 242 309 429 478 510 421 299 10 373 158 454 447
DN 10 176 216 248 278 295 229 215 10 264 70 166 279
Patch size = 256 x 256 pixels (∼13000 patches per camera per pipeline)
RT 15 10 10 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 11 11 12
AT 10 54 52 47 52 53 44 58 10 62 15 27 41
LZ 11 111 153 132 154 158 131 135 10 151 36 83 114
DR 11 90 114 161 172 178 109 106 10 121 37 94 129
LR 11 103 132 174 201 207 128 124 10 141 44 111 150
AF 11 105 137 180 205 218 135 127 10 148 48 118 156
LM 11 126 174 173 203 209 309 183 10 232 58 138 160
DX 10 57 63 56 64 65 65 72 10 85 15 34 50
C1 10 10 10 11 10 10 10 10 932 10 10 10 11
LT 10 64 73 67 77 79 83 82 10 178 18 43 61
IN 10 14 16 19 19 20 18 14 10 18 37 17 19
UN 11 58 77 108 117 123 97 71 10 86 41 110 103
DN 10 43 54 63 70 73 54 52 10 64 20 42 67
Patch size = 128 x 128 pixels (∼55000 patches per camera per pipeline)
RT 11 10 10 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 10 11 11
AT 10 17 15 14 15 15 14 17 10 17 11 13 14
LZ 11 28 40 30 35 35 31 34 10 37 14 21 26
DR 11 21 26 38 40 42 24 24 10 27 14 24 30
LR 11 24 31 42 48 50 28 29 10 32 15 28 35
AF 11 24 32 43 49 52 29 29 10 33 15 29 36
LM 11 31 41 36 42 43 75 45 10 57 16 29 32
DX 10 17 17 16 16 16 17 20 10 22 11 13 15
C1 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 240 10 10 10 11
LT 11 18 19 17 18 18 21 22 10 46 12 14 16
IN 10 11 11 12 12 12 11 11 10 11 14 12 12
UN 11 16 19 26 29 30 21 18 10 20 15 28 25
DN 10 14 15 18 19 19 15 15 10 16 12 14 18
TABLE IV
TPR AT 0.5 % FPR USING PRNU PIPE (LIBRAW AND AFFINITY) AND
TEST IMAGES (OF ALL PIPELINES) FOR CROSS-PIPELINE EXPERIMENTS
Camera Processing Pipelines for Test Images
Camera RT AT LZ DR LR AF LM DX C1 LT IN UN DN
PRNU pipe = LibRaw
Patch size = 256 x 256 pixels (∼40,000 patches per camera per pipeline)
N7k 0.25 0.88 0.91 0.93 0.95 0.94 0.92 0.90 0.07 0.94 0.69 0.85 0.88
N90 0.06 0.68 0.75 0.73 0.77 0.76 0.69 0.73 0.06 0.72 0.47 0.68 0.58
C4D 0.72 - 0.72 0.73 0.75 0.75 0.70 0.73 0.67 0.73 0.44 0.22 0.62
C5D 0.69 - 0.69 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.64 0.68 0.63 0.67 0.47 0.57 0.59
Patch size = 128 x 128 pixels (∼155,000 patches per pipeline)
N7k 0.23 0.59 0.66 0.69 0.74 0.75 0.64 0.63 0.06 0.68 0.44 0.61 0.65
N90 0.07 0.47 0.54 0.54 0.58 0.58 0.46 0.49 0.06 0.48 0.26 0.48 0.41
C4D 0.45 - 0.43 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.43 0.45 0.38 0.42 0.23 0.10 0.40
C5D 0.51 - 0.51 0.51 0.54 0.55 0.44 0.49 0.42 0.45 0.28 0.42 0.43
PRNU pipe = Affinity
Patch size = 256 x 256 pixels (∼40,000 patches per camera per pipeline)
N7k 0.26 0.89 0.92 0.93 0.95 0.94 0.92 0.90 0.07 0.94 0.70 0.86 0.88
N90 0.07 0.70 0.76 0.74 0.78 0.78 0.70 0.73 0.06 0.73 0.48 0.68 0.59
C4D 0.73 - 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.71 0.74 0.68 0.73 0.45 0.24 0.64
C5D 0.68 - 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.64 0.68 0.63 0.66 0.46 0.57 0.59
Patch size = 128 x 128 pixels (∼1,55,000 patches per pipeline)
N7k 0.21 0.60 0.67 0.70 0.75 0.76 0.65 0.63 0.06 0.69 0.46 0.62 0.66
N90 0.07 0.49 0.55 0.55 0.58 0.59 0.48 0.51 0.06 0.50 0.28 0.50 0.43
C4D 0.46 - 0.45 0.50 0.52 0.53 0.45 0.47 0.40 0.44 0.23 0.11 0.42
C5D 0.49 - 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.54 0.42 0.47 0.40 0.43 0.25 0.41 0.43
ing the most conservative setting with limited enhancement
(e.g., default settings in darkroom software) and fixed selection
of images for PRNU estimation, we observed significant dete-
rioration in all metrics, starting with fingerprint correlation, up
to detection statistics and real-world performance metrics. This
means that forensic analysts should be aware of a potential ISP
mismatch, especially when using small analysis windows (e.g.,
manipulation localization) or when stronger enhancement or
post-processing may be involved.
We experimented with 13 different pipelines representing
various digital darkrooms and neural networks. The degrada-
tion was the strongest for smaller patches which are commonly
used in photo manipulation detection. Specifically, for false
positive rate fixed at 0.5%, an average deterioration of 17
percentage points was observed for patches of size 128 px
(sample size 55,000) and 256 px (sample size 13,000). To
illustrate qualitative impact on tampering localization, we
show an example forgery and the corresponding authentication
results in Figure 4. The depicted example is a synthetic forgery
created by pasting a foreign patch of 1024 px inside a full
resolution image taken with Nikon 7000 and processed by each
pipeline. We show both local PCE responses and tampering
probabilities obtained from p-values of PCE statistics [50]. It
can be clearly observed that even for conventional darkroom
software, the results exhibit strong variation.
We expect that the diversity of RAW processing pipelines,
and increasing adoption of computational photography and
machine learning (also directly inside of the cameras) will
have more significant impact on PRNU analysis in the future.
Negative impact of this variation is likely to be most pro-
nounced not only in tampering localization, but also in reduced
forms of PRNU used in large-scale search and attribution [27–
30]. We have run exhaustive experiments, but in a limited,
well-controlled lab setting. In most recent evaluations, other
researchers are also starting to question fingerprint uniqueness
in modern smartphones with advanced cameras [51]. Further
work will be needed to assess the scope of the problem and
to design new solutions. Some early work in this direction
includes PRNU analysis in high-dynamic-range (HDR) pho-
tographs [52].
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TABLE V
MEDIAN PCE VALUES FOR CROSS-PIPELINE ATTRIBUTION OF NON-OVERLAPPING PATCHES FROM CANON EOS 40D
Image Processing Pipelines for Test Images
PRNU
ISP RT AT LZ DR LR AF LM DX C1 LT IN UN DN
Patch size = 1024 x 1024 pixels (∼600 patches per camera per pipeline)
RT 966 - 758 888 1056 1163 1122 966 786 825 146 26 702
AT - - - - - - - - - - - - -
LZ 869 - 825 949 1124 1094 1018 912 719 828 161 26 871
DR 688 - 610 763 873 957 840 696 607 641 106 24 607
LR 960 - 856 1168 1319 1359 1202 972 847 891 172 28 933
AF 1044 - 866 1122 1330 1508 1274 1072 876 966 158 31 939
LM 1166 - 948 1257 1476 1518 1798 1120 1086 1064 125 35 1007
DX 904 - 783 958 1066 1094 1046 1048 767 854 164 26 853
C1 460 - 366 493 570 575 650 473 18923 370 66 21 403
LT 849 - 777 953 1093 1085 1086 938 722 3095 145 26 817
IN 137 - 126 144 157 164 109 156 102 126 1301 19 136
UN 20 - 19 29 29 26 27 19 20 20 17 75 29
DN 715 - 633 853 940 1013 874 712 590 681 137 25 964
Patch size = 512 x 512 pixels (∼3,000 patches per camera per pipeline)
RT 188 - 163 179 201 213 206 193 164 178 32 14 120
AT - - - - - - - - - - - - -
LZ 175 - 186 177 199 207 190 198 149 192 33 14 128
DR 134 - 124 146 166 176 145 137 115 131 25 14 103
LR 175 - 168 192 214 225 196 186 153 180 31 14 135
AF 201 - 188 229 254 269 230 207 177 201 33 15 156
LM 223 - 203 221 244 268 332 239 236 240 25 15 153
DX 177 - 178 166 188 202 198 225 165 199 35 14 121
C1 93 - 85 91 99 107 123 106 5462 98 18 13 66
LT 170 - 176 169 191 202 206 208 163 723 30 14 126
IN 26 - 27 29 29 29 19 32 21 27 192 13 28
UN 11 - 11 14 13 13 12 12 11 11 12 22 15
DN 124 - 119 136 151 162 141 137 106 131 27 14 138
Patch size = 256 x 256 pixels (∼13,000 patches per camera per pipeline)
RT 48 - 42 41 46 47 48 48 38 44 14 12 28
AT - - - - - - - - - - - - -
LZ 47 - 48 42 46 47 46 50 37 48 15 12 30
DR 33 - 31 37 41 42 33 33 26 32 13 12 26
LR 44 - 41 48 52 54 43 44 35 43 15 12 34
AF 49 - 45 54 59 62 50 49 39 48 15 12 37
LM 56 - 52 49 55 56 81 60 58 61 13 12 35
DX 47 - 44 39 44 45 49 58 41 50 15 12 28
C1 25 - 22 23 24 24 31 28 1517 26 12 11 19
LT 45 - 44 39 43 44 51 53 40 195 14 12 28
IN 13 - 13 15 14 14 12 15 12 13 48 11 14
UN 10 - 10 12 11 11 11 11 10 10 11 14 12
DN 32 - 30 35 37 39 32 33 25 32 14 12 33
Patch size = 128 x 128 pixels (∼55,000 patches per camera per pipeline)
RT 12 - 12 12 11 12 11 12 11 11 10 11 12
AT - - - - - - - - - - - - -
LZ 17 - 21 16 16 16 14 17 14 15 12 13 14
DR 13 - 14 16 15 15 12 14 12 13 11 13 14
LR 16 - 16 19 20 20 14 16 13 14 12 14 15
AF 15 - 16 18 18 20 13 15 13 14 12 14 15
LM 11 - 11 12 11 11 12 12 12 12 10 11 12
DX 15 - 16 15 14 15 17 25 16 17 12 12 13
C1 10 - 11 11 11 11 11 11 397 11 10 10 11
LT 11 - 12 12 11 12 12 13 11 24 10 11 11
IN 10 - 10 11 10 11 10 11 10 10 12 10 11
UN 13 - 13 14 14 14 12 12 12 12 11 15 13
DN 11 - 11 12 11 12 11 11 11 11 10 11 12
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Fig. 5. Distribution of PCE scores for cross-ISP matching (512 px patches); the dashed vertical line shows a common acceptance threshold of 50.
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Fig. 6. Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves with LibRaw as PRNU estimation ISP and all pipelines as test.
